certifying the existence of genocide as an exclusive precondition of intervention 3 and would give even more strength-as we will see-to Scheffer's second proposal.
In this second proposal, Scheffer sets out to render the description of genocide and other atrocities meriting effective governmental and organizational responses (crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and aggression) more accurate. He therefore suggests the use of a new concept of ''atrocity crimes'' as violations of ''atrocity law'' (a mix of international criminal law, international human-rights law, international humanitarian law, and the law of war). There are two main reasons to support this proposal. From a practical point of view, the terms ''atrocity crimes'' and ''atrocity law'' have the great merit of addressing a complex corpus of different criminal acts described in multiple norms of international law, thus providing a unified and simplified (rather than accurate) description or denomination-in other words, a useful ''conceptual short cut.'' Just as the word ''feline'' refers to many animals, the words ''atrocity crimes'' and ''atrocity law'' respectively refer, in a strongly expressive (almost ''visual'') way, to diverse acts and norms related to the most serious international crimes. From a legal point of view, Scheffer's second proposal is very attractive, since it reflects the spirit underlying the work of codification 4 done by both the International Law Commission (ILC) and the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is manifested in four key ways:
(1) Scheffer's ''atrocity crimes'' as violations of ''atrocity law'' are actually nothing more than the ''crimes against the peace and security of mankind'' mentioned in the 1996 ILC Draft Code 5 (crimes against UN and associated personnel excluded) 6 or the ''most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole'' of the 1998 ICC Rome Statute. 7 Moreover, this corpus of international crimes, which Scheffer refers to as ''atrocity crimes,'' initially formed part of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 8 and for Rwanda (ICTR). 9 Scheffer's definition of each of these crimes is based on the two tribunals' case law. This choice is coherent and appropriate because the aforesaid case law is itself grounded on international customary law, notably interpreted in the light of the 1996 ILC Draft Code, 10 and also greatly influenced the drafting of the 1998 ICC Statute.
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(2) The idea that ''atrocity crimes'' have in common the fact of being particularly heinous acts of an orchestrated character, significant magnitude, and severe gravity, committed in time of war or in time of peace, summarizes perfectly the approach expressed in the work of the ILC, the ad hoc international judges, and the drafters of the Rome Statute, as well as the work of major legal scholars: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are perceived as being ''core crimes'' of international law, constituting violations of imperative international customary norms-or jus cogens norms 12 -that protect human dignity and concerning the international community of sovereign states as a whole. 13 (3) As noted by Scheffer, the term ''atrocity law'' offers an opportunity to correct the inaccurate general reference to ''international humanitarian law'' (i.e., the law of armed conflicts, which does not concern genocide or crimes against humanity committed outside the ambit of armed conflict) as the field of international law covering the crimes in question. More precisely, it actually acknowledges the international criminal tribunals' broad interpretation of this body of law, which goes beyond both the text of their statutes 14 18 It is particularly interesting at this point to remember that, in its first works on state responsibility, the ILC distinguished international ''delicts'' and ''crimes''-the latter referring to violations of ''superior norms'' of international law, which implicitly meant peremptory norms of jus cogens.
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Even though the very controversial term ''international state crimes'' has since been abandoned, the ILC Draft Articles adopts a close distinction between ''internationally wrongful acts'' and ''serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.'' 20 It would, accordingly, be possible to understand the latter as including breaches of obligations under atrocity law-in other words, including atrocity crimes. 21 This possibility is confirmed by the ILC Draft Articles' commentary on art. 40, which defines the scope of application of those ''serious breaches'': after noting that ''it is not appropriate to set out examples of the peremptory norms referred to in the text of article 40 itself, any more than it was in the text of article 53 of the Vienna Convention,'' 22 the drafters affirm that basic rules of international humanitarian law and prohibitions on aggression, genocide, and crimes against humanity are to be regarded as such.
23
For all these reasons, I not only support Scheffer's second proposal but also believe that, looking back to the initial goal of this discussion (that is, to think out more effective actions to intervene and protect civilian populations), his concept of ''atrocity crimes''-as violations of atrocity law binding on individuals and states-should be taken into consideration for a better legal understanding of intervention.
Scheffer seems to associate the terms ''intervention'' and ''prevention''-the latter being used in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). 24 He therefore presupposes that international intervention is determined by the existence of acts of genocide-hence his first proposal to liberate the use of the term ''genocide'' from strict legal requirements in order to stimulate the international community to act more quickly. In my opinion, this presupposition is nevertheless questionable, for two reasons. First, intervention and prevention are not necessarily interchangeable: on the one hand, international intervention may be punitive (notably in the case of judicial intervention, such as the creation of the international criminal tribunals by the UN Security Council); on the other, prevention may be independent from any international intervention (in the case of national preventive measures such as, for example, the prohibition of genocide in domestic law). Second, the use of the term ''prevention'' in the UNCG is actually unclear, 25 and ''nowhere does the Genocide Convention recognize that individual States or the international community acting in concert may or must intervene in order to prevent the crime. '' 26 Article 1 of the UNCG definitely sets out an erga omnes obligation to prevent (and to punish), 27 but whether the scope of this obligation includes a duty of humanitarian intervention is uncertain and controversial.
28 David Scheffer himself, as the US ambassador for war crimes at the time, expressed in late 1998 the view that there is no such legal obligation in the strict sense of the term. 29 The fact remains that art. 8 of the UNCG authorizes the contracting parties to ''call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention . . . of acts of genocide.'' The reference to the UN Charter is a key element in better understanding intervention (putting aside the question of whether it is a right or an obligation implicitly provided for in the UNCG), since its legal basis is, after all, chapter 7 of that charter. As an exception to the general principles of sovereign equality (art. 2, §1) 30 and non-intervention (art. 2, §4, §7), 31 the second sentence of art. 2, §7 32 of the UN Charter enables the application of enforcement measures under chapter 7 related to action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. International intervention is indeed justified under the law of the United Nations as soon as, in the Security Council's discretionary estimation, 33 peace and security are threatened. Now, on this particular point, both the Security Council 34 and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 35 consider that the ''serious violations of international humanitarian law'' committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda-that is, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which together constitute Scheffer's category of ''atrocity crimes''-constitute such a threat. As a result, ''[t]he implicit philosophy is that gross human rights violations anywhere are a threat to peace and security everywhere'' 36 and justify (just as breaches of peace and aggression do) an action to intervene on the grounds of chapter 7. More specifically, in the light of the preceding developments, it is possible to understand intervention, legally speaking, as a collective action authorized by the Security Council 37 and determined by the occurrence of atrocity crimes (or violations of atrocity law) that are deemed a threat to international peace and security, within the meaning of chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This apprehension of intervention, connected with Scheffer's concept of atrocity crimes on the basis of the normative developments notably generated by the crises in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, can lead to a more effective action of the international community in an ''atrocity zone,'' thus extending the legal scope of intervention to the most serious international crimes against fundamental human values, for the protection of civilians and in the interest of the whole international community.
Of course, that said, and as pointed out by others, support for the international implementation of minimum human rights in the face of severe governmental abuses and criminality should not disguise the risk of a postcolonial revival of interventionary diplomacy. 38 The key is finding a ''proper balance in particular situations as between sovereign rights and humanitarian intervention'' 39 -a balance that depends, in the last instance, on the motives behind the political will of the Security Council to use-or not to use-its discretionary power, or on the scale of the interventionary operation required and its evaluation, not to mention the decision-making process within the principal organ of the United Nations often criticized for the hegemony of the United States. 40 All these elements relate to the important and ongoing debate over the forms of legality review of Security Council decisions, ''subject to respect for peremptory norms of international law.'' . Such an expression should be understood as referring to the specific legal requirements provided for the qualification of genocide (in particular, the special ''intent to destroy'' a group), not as referring to a hierarchy of crimes that would imply differences in the sentencing of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. After much hesitation and ambiguity on this issue, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals ultimately rejected the idea that there is a hierarchy among those crimes in terms of seriousness or gravity. Ibid., 561-62. Council's power to qualify a situation as being a ''threat to the peace'' see Hans Kelsen,
